Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in India: Meaning, Jurisdiction, Procedure, SARFAESI Applications and Appeals to the DRAT

A Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) is a tribunal set up under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, which was enacted as the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. In the words of the Department of Financial Services (DFS) of the Ministry of Finance, the Act provides for tribunals “for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions.” DRT stands for Debts Recovery Tribunal, and appeals from it go to a Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). Banks and financial institutions file their recovery cases before a DRT, and borrowers, guarantors and others affected by a bank’s action under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 bring their own applications before the same tribunal. This guide explains how many DRTs there are, the ₹20 lakh limit for a bank’s case, the two main kinds of cases and how each one runs, appeals to the DRAT, the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, and fees and case status, with a summary in Hindi.

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Provisions of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 are quoted from its India Code text as on 15 May 2026, provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 from its India Code text read in October 2026 (which prints no “as on” date), and the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 from its India Code text as on 25 August 2026. The parts of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act quoted here are the same in that text and in the version reproduced by the Supreme Court in Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (21 September 2023). Wording taken from Supreme Court judgments of 2002 to 2006 is presented as the law at that time.

What is a DRT? Meaning and full form

DRT is short for Debts Recovery Tribunal, the tribunal set up under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy (RDB) Act, 1993. Both spellings are used in official documents: the DFS page and the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 say “Debts Recovery Tribunal”, the DFS Annual Report 2025-26 uses both spellings, and the Reserve Bank of India writes “Debt Recovery Tribunals”. They mean the same body.

A DRT is one of the special tribunals that the 1993 Act set up in place of ordinary civil suits for these debts. Under Section 3, the Central Government establishes the tribunals by notification and specifies the areas within which each one may exercise jurisdiction, and under Section 8 it establishes the Appellate Tribunals and specifies the DRTs over which each has jurisdiction. Section 4 says that a tribunal consists of one person only, the Presiding Officer, appointed by the Central Government, and according to the DFS, “Each DRT and DRAT are headed by a Presiding Officer and a Chairperson respectively.” The Act also provides for a Recovery Officer appointed by the Central Government for each tribunal (Section 2(k)), who carries out the tribunal’s certificates of recovery, as explained below. Under Section 22(1), the tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but “shall be guided by the principles of natural justice” and may regulate their own procedure, including the places where they sit.

The DFS’s table of disposals divides the cases into two main kinds: an “OA” is an “Original Application filed by Banks/Financial Institutions”, the lender’s own case for recovery, and an “SA” is an application under the SARFAESI Act filed by borrowers, guarantors or third parties, usually against the steps a bank has taken to enforce its security without going to court.

Why DRTs were set up

Before 1993, a bank that wanted its money back had to file an ordinary suit. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1993 Act, which the Supreme Court reproduced in Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (21 September 2023) through an earlier judgment, explains the problem. It begins: “Banks and financial institutions at present experience considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with them.” It records that “In 1981, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri T. Tiwari had examined the legal and other difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions and suggested remedial measures including changes in law”, and that “The Tiwari Committee had also suggested setting up of Special Tribunals for recovery of dues of the banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure.”

The scale of the backlog is set out in the same statement: “on 30-9-1990 more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the financial institutions were pending in various courts, recovery of debts involved more than Rs 5622 crores in dues of public sector banks and about Rs 391 crores of dues of the financial institutions.” It adds that the Committee on the Financial System headed by Shri M. Narasimham had considered such special tribunals critical to the successful implementation of the financial sector reforms. The purpose of the Bill was stated in one line: it “seeks to provide for the establishment of Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions.”

In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010), in paragraphs that the Supreme Court quoted again in Celir, the Court recalled that the Tiwari Committee “noted that the existing procedure for recovery was very cumbersome”, and it “also prepared a draft of the proposed legislation which contained a provision for disposal of cases in three months and conferment of power upon the Recovery Officer for expeditious execution of orders made by adjudicating bodies.”

The Act’s validity was challenged in the courts. In Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association (14 March 2002), a bench of Justices B.N. Kirpal, Y.K. Sabharwal and K.G. Balakrishnan, allowing the appeals of the Union of India and the banks, held that “entry 45 of List I would cover the types of legislation now enacted” and concluded that the “Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is a valid piece of legislation.” The Court explained the background in a sentence: “In order to remedy the locking up of huge funds, the Parliament enacted the said Act”.

The laws that govern DRTs

Two statutes matter. The first is the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (Act 51 of 1993). It was enacted as the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the name the Supreme Court used in 2002 and still used in 2023. The India Code text records that the words “Due to Banks and Financial Institutions” in the title were replaced by “and Bankruptcy” by Section 249 and the Fifth Schedule of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, with effect from 1 December 2019; the current title is the one used in the Reserve Bank of India’s list of Acts and on the DFS website. Section 17(1) gives a DRT the jurisdiction “to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions”, and Section 17(2) gives the Appellate Tribunal the jurisdiction to hear appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a DRT under the Act. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 also added Section 17(1A), under which a DRT is to decide applications under Part III of that Code from a date appointed by the Central Government, and the Act’s long title now also refers to “insolvency resolution and bankruptcy of individuals and partnership firms”. Procedure is also set out in the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, dated 20 August 1993, which the India Code record of the Act lists among its rules, together with amendments that include “various amendments in DRAT and DRT procedural rules” dated 3 November 2016.

The second is the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), Act 54 of 2002, enacted on 17 December 2002 according to its India Code record. The DFS describes it as “an Act to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of Financial Assets and enforcement of security interest.” Its key feature, as the Supreme Court put it in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (8 April 2004), is that “the creditor is empowered to enforce the security himself without intervention of the Court.” In Transcore v. Union of India (29 November 2006), Justices Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia said that “The very object of Section 13 of NPA Act is recovery by non-adjudicatory process” (the Court called the SARFAESI Act the “NPA Act”).

The two Acts work side by side. Transcore held that “withdrawal of the O.A. pending before the DRT under the DRT Act is not a pre-condition for taking recourse to NPA Act”, because “the NPA Act is an additional remedy to the DRT Act. Together they constitute one remedy”, and “there is no repugnancy nor inconsistency between the two remedies, therefore, the doctrine of election has no application.” In practice, therefore, a bank may have an Original Application pending in a DRT and still enforce its security under the SARFAESI Act. Section 19(1) of the RDB Act also allows a bank, with the DRT’s permission, to withdraw its application in order to act under the SARFAESI Act if it has not already done so, and the DRT must decide such a request within thirty days.

Both Acts have been amended many times, including by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 44 of 2016), which among other things substituted Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, as the Supreme Court explained in Celir (2023). The DFS Annual Report 2025-26 mentions two of the changes, without giving dates: a thirty-day period for the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate “to pass orders for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets”, and “three months imprisonment” if a borrower does not give details of assets other than those specified by the lender. Both appear in the current texts. The first is in Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act: India Code shows the words “within a period of thirty days from the date of application” as inserted, with effect from 1 September 2016, into the proviso under which the Magistrate passes orders for taking possession, and a further proviso added from the same date allows the Magistrate, for reasons beyond his control recorded in writing, a longer period not exceeding sixty days in all. The second is Section 19(5)(iii) of the RDB Act, explained below.

The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026

The latest change concerns the people who sit on the tribunals rather than the procedure. The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 (Act 17 of 2026, dated 13 August 2026), which India Code shows as coming into force on 25 August 2026 under notification S.O. 4713(E), lists the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in its First Schedule. Its Second Schedule substitutes Sections 6A and 15A of the RDB Act, so that the qualifications, manner of selection, appointment, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other conditions of service and eligibility for reappointment of a DRT’s Presiding Officer and a DRAT’s Chairperson “shall be governed by the provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026.” Under that Act, the Chairperson and Members of every listed tribunal are appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation of a Search-cum-Selection Committee (Section 14(2)), and a Chairperson, a term that includes a Presiding Officer, holds office for five years or until the age of seventy, whichever is earlier (Sections 2(a) and 17(1)). The Act also provides for a National Tribunals Commission and repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021. Sections 6A and 15A are the only provisions of the RDB Act that it amends, so the procedure, time limits and deposits described in this guide are not affected. The India Code text of the RDB Act used here, dated 15 May 2026, still shows Sections 6A and 15A in their earlier form, which referred to the 2021 Act.

How many DRTs are there, and where?

The DFS states: “At present, 39 Debts Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) and 5 Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals (DRATs) are functioning across the country.” Its Annual Report 2025-26 lists the 39 DRTs in 25 cities, as below, and the five DRATs at Allahabad, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai.

Delhi has three tribunals, DRT-1, DRT-2 and DRT-3, and the DRAT Delhi. The firm’s free Delhi DRT jurisdiction finder shows, as a guide, which of the three Delhi DRTs covers each police station area; confirm with the DRT concerned before filing.

The DFS also publishes the number of cases the tribunals have disposed of. Its table shows the following for recent years.

In all, according to the same table, 1,99,109 Original Applications involving ₹8,96,806.98 crore and 75,914 SARFAESI applications involving ₹5,97,589.33 crore were disposed of between 2017-18 and December 2024. The Reserve Bank of India’s Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2024-25 gives the recovery side. Through DRTs, scheduled commercial banks referred 30,806 cases involving ₹79,414 crore in 2023-24 and recovered ₹13,527 crore (17.0 per cent); in 2024-25 (provisional figures) they referred 34,430 cases involving ₹1,29,516 crore and recovered ₹12,363 crore (9.5 per cent). The RBI notes that the amount recovered in a year can relate to cases referred in earlier years, and that “The IBC remained the dominant mode of recovery, followed by the SARFAESI route.”

The ₹20 lakh limit and who can file

A DRT does not hear every claim by a bank. Section 1(4) of the Act says that, save as otherwise provided, its provisions “shall not apply where the amount of debt due to any bank or financial institution or to a consortium of banks or financial institutions is less than ten lakh rupees or such other amount, being not less than one lakh rupees, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify.” The DFS Annual Report 2025-26 records that the “Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRTs) was increased from ₹10 lakh to ₹20 lakh to enable the DRTs to focus on high value cases.” Read together, these mean that a bank’s or financial institution’s recovery case for a debt of less than ₹20 lakh does not go to a DRT. The firm did not open the notification itself for this review, so its number and date are not given here. “Debt” is defined widely in Section 2(g): it covers any liability, inclusive of interest, claimed as due from any person by a bank or financial institution, or a consortium of them, during the course of its business, whether secured or unsecured, and whether payable under a decree or order of a civil court, an arbitration award, a mortgage or otherwise, if it is subsisting and legally recoverable on the date of the application.

The SARFAESI Act has its own exclusions. Under Section 31 it does not apply, among other things, to a pledge of movables, to “any security interest for securing repayment of any financial asset not exceeding one lakh rupees”, to “any security interest created in agricultural land”, or to “any case in which the amount due is less than twenty per cent. of the principal amount and interest thereon”. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, under which a borrower or other aggrieved person applies to the DRT, does not itself set a minimum amount.

The Original Application is the lender’s remedy, so a borrower does not file an OA. A borrower is heard in other ways: by contesting the bank’s OA, with the right to claim a set-off and to set up a counter-claim (Section 19(6) and (8)); by applying to the DRT against measures taken under the SARFAESI Act; and by appealing to the tribunal against an order of its Recovery Officer (Section 30). Each is explained below.

The bank’s case: Original Application, recovery certificate and Recovery Officer

A bank or financial institution starts its case by an application to the DRT under Section 19 of the Act. Under Section 19(1), it may apply to the tribunal within whose local limits the bank’s branch or other office that maintains the account in which the debt is outstanding lies, any of the defendants actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain, or the cause of action arises wholly or in part. The application must be in the prescribed form, with true copies of all the documents relied on and the prescribed fee (Section 19(3)), and it must give particulars of the securities and their estimated value and, if they are not enough, of the defendants’ other properties (Section 19(3A)). Under Section 24, the Limitation Act, 1963 applies, as far as may be, to an application made to a tribunal. The defendant may appear in person or through one or more legal practitioners (Section 23(2)).

On receiving the application, the tribunal issues summons directing the defendant to show cause within thirty days of service why the relief prayed for should not be granted and to disclose properties or assets other than those listed by the bank, and restraining the defendant from dealing with or disposing of the assets disclosed until the application for attachment is decided (Section 19(4)). From the service of summons, the defendant must not transfer, by sale, lease or otherwise, except in the ordinary course of business, any of the assets over which security interest has been created or the other properties specified or disclosed, without the tribunal’s prior approval (Section 19(4A)). If the defendant does not comply with the order to disclose, the Presiding Officer may, after giving a hearing, order the person or officer in default to be detained in civil prison for up to three months (Section 19(5)(iii)). The written statement of defence, with any claim for set-off or counter-claim and the documents relied on, must be filed within thirty days from the service of summons; the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and in special circumstances recorded in writing, extend this by not more than fifteen days (Section 19(5)(i)).

The defendant can do more than deny the claim. Under Section 19(6), a defendant may claim to set off against the bank’s demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable from the bank, and under Section 19(7) the written statement “shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit”. Under Section 19(8), the defendant may also set up a counter-claim, which “shall have the same effect as a cross-suit” (Section 19(9)). Every application, written statement, set-off claim and counter-claim must be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts (Section 19(10A)). If the defendant admits all or part of the debt, the tribunal orders payment of the admitted amount within thirty days, failing which it may issue a certificate for that amount (Section 19(5B)). A borrower who disputes the amount, the interest charged or the bank’s conduct should therefore put that case in writing, on affidavit and in time, rather than ignore the summons.

After hearing both sides on all claims, set-off, counter-claims and interest, the tribunal passes its interim or final order within thirty days from the conclusion of the hearings, and the order may include interest from the date on which the amount is found due until it is realised or actually paid (Section 19(20)). Section 19(24) asks the tribunal to deal with the application as expeditiously as possible, to make every effort to complete the proceedings in two hearings, and to dispose of it finally within one hundred and eighty days from its receipt. With the final order, the Presiding Officer issues a certificate of recovery to the Recovery Officer for the debt with interest (Section 19(22)). A recovery certificate is also treated as a decree or order of a court for starting winding-up proceedings against a company or limited liability partnership, or insolvency proceedings against an individual or partnership firm (Section 19(22A)).

The Recovery Officer then recovers the amount in the certificate by one or more of the modes in Section 25: attachment and sale of the defendant’s movable or immovable property; taking possession of property over which security interest is created, or any other property of the defendant, appointing a receiver and selling it; arrest of the defendant and detention in prison; appointing a receiver to manage the defendant’s properties; or any other mode prescribed by the Central Government. Section 28 adds other modes, such as requiring a person who owes money to the defendant to pay the Recovery Officer instead. The defendant cannot dispute before the Recovery Officer the correctness of the amount specified in the certificate (Section 26(1)). The Presiding Officer may grant time to pay if the defendant makes a down payment of not less than twenty-five per cent of the amount in the certificate and gives an unconditional undertaking to pay the balance within a reasonable time, which is acceptable to the bank or financial institution holding the recovery certificate; a defendant who agrees to pay in this way, and whose recovery proceedings are stayed, forfeits the right to appeal against the tribunal’s orders (Section 27(1) and (1B)). Any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer may appeal to the tribunal within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him (Section 30(1)), but if that person owes the debt, the appeal will not be entertained unless fifty per cent of the debt as determined by the tribunal has been deposited (Section 30A).

SARFAESI action and the borrower’s application to the DRT

Many borrowers meet the DRT after a bank has acted under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. The process starts with a demand notice. Under Section 13(2), where a borrower defaults in repaying a secured debt or any instalment of it and the secured creditor classifies the account as a non-performing asset, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge his liabilities in full “within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4).”

The borrower can reply. Under Section 13(3A), if the borrower “makes any representation or raises any objection”, the secured creditor must consider it and, if it finds the objection “not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance”. The proviso adds that the reasons communicated, or the likely action of the creditor at that stage, “shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A.” The Supreme Court had insisted on reasons in Mardia Chemicals (2004), calling for “some meaningful consideration of the objections raised rather than to ritually reject them” and holding that “Such reasons, overruling the objections of the borrower, must also be communicated to the borrower by the secured creditor.”

If the borrower does not pay within the sixty days, Section 13(4) allows the creditor to take one or more measures, including to “take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset”, to “take over the management of the business of the borrower”, to appoint a manager for assets taken over, or to require anyone who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower, and owes the borrower money, to pay the creditor instead. In Transcore the Court held that “The dichotomy between symbolic and physical possession does not find place in the Act.” Under Section 13(13), after receiving the demand notice, the borrower must not “transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor.”

This is where the DRT comes in for the borrower. Under Section 17(1) as it now stands, “Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter” may apply, with the prescribed fee, to the DRT having jurisdiction “within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken”. Under Section 17(1A), the application is filed before the DRT within whose local limits the cause of action arises wholly or in part, the secured asset is located, or the bank’s branch or other office that maintains the account in which the debt is outstanding lies. As first enacted, Section 17(1) called this remedy an appeal (“may prefer an appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal”), with the same forty-five days; India Code records that the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 replaced “may prefer an appeal” with the present words, with effect from 21 June 2002, the date from which the SARFAESI Act itself is deemed to have come into force (Section 1(3)).

The DRT considers whether the measures taken under Section 13(4) are in accordance with the Act and the rules made under it (Section 17(2)). If it concludes that they are not, and that the management or possession of the secured assets should be restored, it may declare the recourse to those measures invalid, restore possession or management to the borrower or other applicant, and give other appropriate directions (Section 17(3)). Where it holds that the bank’s possession was not in accordance with the Act and directs the assets to be returned, the borrower or other applicant is entitled to such compensation and costs as the tribunal determines (Section 19 of the SARFAESI Act). If it finds the measures lawful, the bank may go on with them (Section 17(4)). The DRT can also examine a tenancy or lease claimed over the secured asset, for example one created after the demand notice (Section 17(4A)). The application is to be disposed of within sixty days; the DRT may extend this for reasons recorded in writing, but the total period of pendency must not exceed four months from the date of the application (Section 17(5)); if the application is not decided within four months, any party may ask the Appellate Tribunal to direct expeditious disposal (Section 17(6)).

The original Act also said that the DRT would not entertain the borrower’s appeal (as the original Act called it) unless seventy-five per cent of the amount claimed had been deposited, although the DRT could waive or reduce the deposit for reasons recorded in writing. The Supreme Court struck that condition down in Mardia Chemicals. It said that “sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” The 2004 amending Act later substituted sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 17, with effect from 11 November 2004, and the present Section 17 has no deposit condition for an application to the DRT. A deposit arises at the next stage. Under Section 18, a person aggrieved by the DRT’s order under Section 17 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, but “no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less”; the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons recorded in writing, reduce this to not less than twenty-five per cent.

Paying up can still stop a sale, but only in time. Section 13(8), as amended in 2016, says that where the dues of the secured creditor “together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him” are tendered “at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets”, the secured assets “shall not be transferred by way of lease assignment or sale by the secured creditor”. Before the amendment, as the Court explained in Celir, “the borrower shall continue to have a right of redemption of mortgage until the execution of the conveyance”. In Celir the Court held, as it later recorded, “that the High Court erred in permitting the Borrower to redeem the mortgage after publication of the notice of sale / auction under Rule 9 sub-rule (1) of the SARFAESI Rules.”

If the sale does not cover the whole debt, the matter can return to the tribunal. Under Section 13(10), “Where dues of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied with the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application in the form and manner as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction or a competent court, as the case may be, for recovery of the balance amount from the borrower.”

Civil courts have only a small role. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act says that no civil court has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Act to determine, and that “no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act” or under the RDB Act. In Mardia Chemicals the Court held that “The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal”, but that “to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe, whatsoever”.

Guarantors

A guarantor is directly exposed. Section 13(11) of the SARFAESI Act says that the secured creditor “shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without first taking any of the” measures in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 13(4). The definition of “borrower” in Section 2(1)(f), both as first enacted (it was quoted in Mardia Chemicals) and as it stands today, covers any person “who has given any guarantee or created any mortgage or pledge as security for the financial assistance granted”. The DFS lists guarantors, along with borrowers and third parties, among those who file applications under the SARFAESI Act in the DRT.

Appeals: the DRAT and the High Court

An order of a DRT can be challenged before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. Under Section 20 of the RDB Act, any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a DRT under the Act may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction, but no appeal lies from an order made with the consent of the parties. The appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is received, though the Appellate Tribunal may entertain a later appeal if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the delay, and it is to make an endeavour to dispose of the appeal within six months (Section 20(3) and (6)). Under Section 21, an appeal by a person from whom a debt is due to a bank or financial institution is not entertained unless that person has deposited fifty per cent of the debt as determined by the DRT, which the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons recorded in writing, reduce to not less than twenty-five per cent. India Code records that the 2016 amending Act shortened the appeal period from forty-five to thirty days and replaced the earlier deposit of seventy-five per cent, which the Appellate Tribunal could waive or reduce, with effect from 1 September 2016. An appeal against a DRT’s order on a SARFAESI application lies under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, with its own thirty-day period and deposit, as explained above.

A High Court is not usually the first stop. Section 18 of the RDB Act says that no court or other authority, “except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution”, has jurisdiction in relation to the matters within the tribunals’ jurisdiction under Section 17. When it dismissed the challenges to the Act in Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association (2002), the Supreme Court said that “It would be open to the parties to raise other contentions on the merits of their cases before the authority constituted under the Act and, only thereafter, should a High Court entertain a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution.” The firm’s guide to review, revision and appeal explains how appellate remedies work in general.

Fees, filing and case status

Fees are fixed by rules. Section 19(3) of the RDB Act requires a bank’s application to be accompanied by the prescribed fee and allows the fee to be prescribed “having regard to the amount of debt to be recovered”, and Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act requires the prescribed fee for an application against SARFAESI measures and provides that “different fees may be prescribed” for the borrower and for others. For an Original Application, the fee is prescribed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, as amended; for an SA, confirm the current fee with the DRT. The firm’s free DRT court fee calculator gives an estimate for an Original Application, for an SA filed by a borrower and for an SA filed by another aggrieved person, but the amount should be confirmed with the DRT before filing. The Supreme Court noted in Transcore (2006) that under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2004, dated 6 April 2004, the fee for an application under Section 17 “shall be mutatis mutandis as provided for filing of an application to DRT under Section 19 of the DRT Act read with Rule 7 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993”, and it rejected the borrowers’ challenge to that fee.

For filing and for the status of a pending case, the DFS page on the tribunals links to the official website of the Debts Recovery Tribunals, https://drt.gov.in/, and you can also enquire at the DRT concerned. Section 19A of the RDB Act lets the Central Government provide by rules, from notified dates and before notified tribunals, for pleadings and documents to be filed in electronic form with a digital signature, and for summons and notices to be served electronically. It also says that an interim or final order displayed on a tribunal’s website is deemed to be a public notice of the order, and that sending the order by e-mail to a party’s registered address is deemed to be service on that party, so keep the e-mail address you give the tribunal up to date. When counting the days for a reply or an appeal, the firm’s limitation and days calculator is a quick check, though the period itself must come from the Act.

Practical points for borrowers and guarantors

If you dispute a demand notice under Section 13(2), it is best to reply in writing well within the sixty days and to keep proof of the dates. After the notice, do not transfer the secured asset without the bank’s written consent, other than in the ordinary course of business (Section 13(13)). Once the bank takes a measure such as possession, the forty-five days for an application to the DRT start to run (Section 17(1)), and to keep the property, the full dues with costs and charges must be tendered before the notice of public auction, quotation or tender is published (Section 13(8)). If a bank files an Original Application, file your written statement, with any set-off or counter-claim, within thirty days of service of the summons (Section 19(5)), and do not transfer the secured or disclosed assets by sale, lease or otherwise, except in the ordinary course of business, without the tribunal’s approval (Section 19(4A)). Any appeal to the DRAT must be filed within thirty days.

For recovery outside the tribunal, including the conduct of recovery agents, see the firm’s guide on loan default and loan settlement.

How a DRT lawyer at Century Law Firm can help

Century Law Firm, Delhi, advises and represents borrowers, guarantors and lenders in matters before the Debts Recovery Tribunals and the DRAT, including Original Applications, applications against SARFAESI measures, appeals and proceedings before the Recovery Officer. A lawyer can check whether each statutory step was followed, from the demand notice and the reply to objections to the possession and auction notices, work out the right tribunal and the court fee, and prepare the application, reply or appeal within time. To discuss a case, see the firm’s practice areas page. The firm’s office is shown on the map below.

डीआरटी (DRT) क्या है – हिंदी में

DRT का पूरा नाम (full form) Debts Recovery Tribunal है, जिसे Debt Recovery Tribunal भी लिखा जाता है। इसका शाब्दिक अर्थ है ऋण (कर्ज़) वसूली के लिए बना न्यायाधिकरण। DRT का गठन Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 के तहत हुआ है, जिसका मूल नाम Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 था; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 के ज़रिये 1 दिसंबर 2019 से इसका नाम बदला गया। वित्त मंत्रालय के वित्तीय सेवाएँ विभाग (Department of Financial Services) के अनुसार यह कानून बैंकों और वित्तीय संस्थानों के बकाया कर्ज़ों के शीघ्र निर्णय और वसूली के लिए न्यायाधिकरण बनाने हेतु है। हर DRT का प्रमुख एक पीठासीन अधिकारी (Presiding Officer) होता है और हर DRAT (Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal) का प्रमुख एक अध्यक्ष (Chairperson)। अंतिम आदेश के साथ पीठासीन अधिकारी वसूली प्रमाणपत्र (certificate of recovery) जारी करता है (धारा 19(22)), और वसूली अधिकारी (Recovery Officer) धारा 25 में बताए तरीकों से, जैसे संपत्ति की कुर्की और बिक्री, रकम वसूल करता है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने 2002 में इस कानून को वैध ठहराया था। India Code के अनुसार 25 अगस्त 2026 से लागू Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 के बाद DRT के पीठासीन अधिकारी और DRAT के अध्यक्ष की योग्यता, चयन, नियुक्ति और सेवा की शर्तें उसी कानून से तय होती हैं; DRT की प्रक्रिया, समय-सीमाएँ और जमा राशि के नियम इससे नहीं बदले।

देश में कितने DRT हैं? वित्तीय सेवाएँ विभाग के अनुसार इस समय 39 DRT और 5 DRAT काम कर रहे हैं। DRAT इलाहाबाद, चेन्नई, दिल्ली, कोलकाता और मुंबई में हैं। दिल्ली में तीन DRT हैं (DRT-1, DRT-2 और DRT-3) और एक DRAT है। धारा 1(4) के अनुसार यह कानून ₹10 लाख (या केंद्र सरकार द्वारा अधिसूचित किसी दूसरी राशि) से कम के कर्ज़ पर लागू नहीं होता। वित्तीय सेवाएँ विभाग के अनुसार DRT के अधिकार क्षेत्र की राशि ₹10 लाख से बढ़ाकर ₹20 लाख कर दी गई है; इसलिए ₹20 लाख से कम के कर्ज़ के लिए बैंक का वसूली मामला (OA) DRT में नहीं जाता। दिल्ली में आपका मामला किस DRT में जाएगा, इसका अनुमान फर्म के DRT टूल में पुलिस स्टेशन चुनकर लगाया जा सकता है; दायर करने से पहले संबंधित DRT से पुष्टि कर लें।

DRT में मुख्य रूप से दो तरह के मामले आते हैं। पहला, OA (Original Application), जो बैंक या वित्तीय संस्था अपना कर्ज़ वसूलने के लिए धारा 19 के तहत दायर करती है। प्रतिवादी को समन मिलने के 30 दिन के भीतर लिखित जवाब (written statement) देना होता है, जिसे पीठासीन अधिकारी असाधारण मामलों में लिखित कारणों से अधिकतम 15 दिन और बढ़ा सकता है (धारा 19(5))। उधारकर्ता (borrower) अपने जवाब में मुजरा (set-off) का दावा और प्रतिदावा (counter-claim) भी कर सकता है (धारा 19(6) और 19(8))। समन मिलने के बाद, सामान्य कारोबार को छोड़कर, सुरक्षित (secured) संपत्तियों और बताई या प्रकट की गई दूसरी संपत्तियों को DRT की पूर्व अनुमति के बिना बेचना, पट्टे पर देना या किसी और तरह हस्तांतरित करना मना है (धारा 19(4A))। कानून के अनुसार DRT हर संभव प्रयास करेगा कि कार्यवाही दो सुनवाई में पूरी हो और आवेदन मिलने के 180 दिन के भीतर उसका अंतिम निपटारा हो (धारा 19(24))।

दूसरा, SA, यानी SARFAESI Act, 2002 के तहत आवेदन, जो उधारकर्ता, गारंटर या कोई तीसरा पक्ष बैंक की कार्रवाई के खिलाफ दायर करता है। खाता NPA होने पर बैंक धारा 13(2) के तहत लिखित नोटिस देकर 60 दिन में पूरा बकाया चुकाने को कहता है; उधारकर्ता आपत्ति करे तो बैंक को आपत्ति न मानने के कारण 15 दिन में बताने होते हैं (धारा 13(3A)), लेकिन उस जवाब के खिलाफ अकेले DRT में आवेदन नहीं हो सकता; 60 दिन में पूरा भुगतान न होने पर बैंक धारा 13(4) के तहत संपत्ति पर कब्ज़ा लेने जैसे कदम उठा सकता है। इन कदमों के खिलाफ DRT में आवेदन कार्रवाई की तारीख से 45 दिन के भीतर करना होता है (धारा 17(1)), इसलिए कब्ज़े का नोटिस मिलते ही सलाह लें। अगर DRT पाता है कि बैंक की कार्रवाई कानून के अनुसार नहीं थी, तो वह उसे अवैध घोषित करके कब्ज़ा या प्रबंधन वापस दिला सकता है (धारा 17(3))। नोटिस मिलने के बाद बैंक की लिखित सहमति के बिना नोटिस में बताई गई सुरक्षित संपत्ति को बेचना, पट्टे पर देना या किसी और तरह हस्तांतरित करना, सामान्य कारोबार को छोड़कर, मना है (धारा 13(13))।

संपत्ति बचाने के लिए पूरा बकाया, सभी खर्चों सहित, नीलामी, कोटेशन या टेंडर की सूचना प्रकाशित होने से पहले चुकाना होता है (धारा 13(8), 2016 के संशोधन के बाद)। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने सेलिर (Celir) मामले (2023) में कहा कि नीलामी सूचना प्रकाशित होने के बाद उधारकर्ता को गिरवी छुड़ाने (redemption) की अनुमति देना हाईकोर्ट की गलती थी। बैंक गारंटर के खिलाफ भी सीधे कार्यवाही कर सकता है (धारा 13(11))। आज की धारा 17 में DRT में आवेदन के लिए कोई जमा-शर्त नहीं है (मार्डिया केमिकल्स, 2004 में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने 75% जमा की मूल शर्त को असंवैधानिक ठहराया था); जमा राशि की शर्त DRAT में अपील के समय लागू होती है।

DRT के आदेश के खिलाफ अपील DRAT में होती है। अपील आदेश मिलने के 30 दिन के भीतर करनी होती है (RDB Act की धारा 20; SARFAESI मामलों में SARFAESI Act की धारा 18)। RDB Act के तहत अपील करने वाले जिस व्यक्ति से कर्ज़ वसूला जाना है, उसे DRT द्वारा तय कर्ज़ की 50% राशि जमा करनी होती है (धारा 21); SARFAESI अपील में उधारकर्ता को बैंक द्वारा दावा की गई रकम या DRT द्वारा तय रकम, इनमें से जो कम हो, उसका 50% जमा करना होता है (SARFAESI Act की धारा 18)। दोनों में DRAT लिखित कारणों से यह राशि घटा सकता है, पर 25% से कम नहीं। RDB Act की धारा 18 दूसरी अदालतों का अधिकार क्षेत्र रोकती है, पर सुप्रीम कोर्ट और अनुच्छेद 226 और 227 के तहत हाईकोर्ट का अधिकार बना रहता है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट (2002) ने कहा था कि पक्षकार अपनी अन्य बातें पहले इस कानून के तहत बने प्राधिकरण के सामने रख सकते हैं, और उसके बाद ही हाईकोर्ट अनुच्छेद 226 या 227 के तहत याचिका पर विचार करे। DRT की कोर्ट फीस का अनुमान फर्म के मुफ्त DRT फीस कैलकुलेटर से लगाया जा सकता है, पर दायर करने से पहले राशि की पुष्टि कर लें। वित्तीय सेवाएँ विभाग DRT की आधिकारिक वेबसाइट drt.gov.in से जोड़ता है; संबंधित DRT से भी जानकारी ली जा सकती है। ट्रिब्यूनल के बाहर वसूली, जिसमें वसूली एजेंटों का आचरण भी शामिल है, के बारे में फर्म की लोन डिफ़ॉल्ट और लोन सेटलमेंट गाइड देखें।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

The Debts Recovery Tribunals were created because ordinary suits were too slow for banks, and today they decide banks’ larger recovery claims and borrowers’ challenges to SARFAESI action. For a borrower or guarantor the time limits matter most: sixty days after the demand notice, fifteen days for the bank’s reasons, forty-five days to apply after a measure such as possession, and the publication of the notice of public auction, quotation or tender as the last point at which the property can be saved by paying in full. An appeal to the DRAT must be filed within thirty days, and a borrower who appeals must make a deposit. Keep every notice and reply, and take advice before a deadline passes.

Sources used for this post: the Department of Financial Services (Ministry of Finance) page on Debts Recovery Tribunals and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals (last updated 5 February 2026) and its Annual Report 2025-26; the Reserve Bank of India’s list of Acts and its Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2024-25 (Table IV.11); the India Code texts of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as on 15 May 2026), the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 (as on 25 August 2026), and India Code’s records of the first two Acts; and the Supreme Court of India’s own copies of Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association (14 March 2002), Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (8 April 2004), Transcore v. Union of India (29 November 2006), Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. (21 September 2023, reproducing Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1993 Act and passages of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon) and Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna (2024 INSC 978, 13 December 2024).